Fund to Advance

Single Stage Technology

v1.06

 

 

Presented by Michael Wallis of the

Experimental Rocket Propulsion Society

to the Human Spaceflight Review Panel

Table of Contents

Introduction------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3

A Sad State of Affairs-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3

The Future That Isn't--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4

Good and Bad Experimentation-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4

The X Factor-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5

Flying Outside The Box----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7

Changing The Funding Paradigm------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8

Leading Rather Than Managing-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9

Five Phases to Space--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10

Phase 1 - "Controlled Flight"----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10

Phase 2 - "Federal X Prize"---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10

Phase 3 - "Rocket Express"----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10

Phase 4 - "Long Range Rocket Express"---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11

Phase 5 - "Orbit"-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11

Subsidiaries-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11

Alternative Formulas----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12

Liability-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12

Death and Taxes----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12

Office Staffing------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13

Advantages-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14

Advantage 1 - Half Way to Anywhere----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14

Advantage 2 - Verify Before Deploy-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14

Advantage 3 - Support for Lunar Outpost------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14

Summation---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15

More Information-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15

Appendix A - Enabling Legislation------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16

Appendix B - Virginia Spaceflight Liability and Immunity Act--------------------- 17


[ Top ]

Introduction

What is the purpose of Human Spaceflight and why is it at NASA? If the purpose of Human Spaceflight is to expand the reach of mankind to orbit, to the Moon and beyond, then how are we doing 50 years on from the first forays into the heavens?

 

In that time, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has made amazing advances in technology and accomplished impressive feats in the exploration of the heavens, greatly enhancing our understanding of our world, of the solar system and of the greater universe beyond. But in the area of human spaceflight their early success has fallen far short of where we could, and should, be now four decades on from "One great leap".

 

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A Sad State of Affairs

For decades, there has been no option for most American citizens to personally go into space. NASA, the government agency responsible for opening space, has spent more than $400 billion in constant dollars through 2008 and plans to spend additional tens of billions over the next five years. But despite almost $450 billion in taxpayer funding, the average American is no closer to space now than they were in 1957. The Russians have started marketing such capabilities (beating us at our own game), but with a price tag of $20-$35 million per seat there have only been a few takers so far. Some people believe that this will, and should, continue to be the case for the next several decades. We would like to propose an alternative to the present mode of operations in order to enhance space operations and promote American use of the "new" frontier. We will look at past and existing private commercial programs to develop reusable space vehicles and we will extend a concept that would allow the government to promote development without employing all the developers.

 

Between 1947 and 1968, the United States made significant leaps in aerospace capabilities, taking us from breaking of the sound barrier to having three men orbit the moon. In the forty years since then - twice the time to achieve these feats - we have retreated from technological advances to marginal improvements and "cost management". In deciding how to go back to the Moon in the next twenty years, NASA has turned back to the Apollo style vehicles and the centralized design bureaus of the Soviet Union and NASA of the 1960's. That we achieved Kennedy's goal by beating the Russians at their own game does not mean, as we've seen in the intervening decades, that this approach will (or even can) provide for the robust human exploration and development of space.

 

While it is true that America as a nation has commercial access to space at this time, American communications satellites are the primary use we have made of our capabilities. Of late, government involvement was at regulatory (permit processing and launch license issuing) and range operations (the commercial launch providers rent range services [tracking, destruct, etc.] from the government) levels. Of note is that, contrary to common perception, NASA is not always involved in these cases. If it is not a NASA payload or program or satellite, commercial operators are free to choose a launch provider who meets their needs such as payload integration, launch costs, timetable, etc. This has resulted in a large amount of US launch business going to overseas companies who offer lower costs because of lower overhead.

 

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The Future That Isn't

There has been continued interest in improving the domestic commercial launch industry, and even to include civilian access to space, but such changes would require a much less expensive launch technology. Both goals argue for development of reusable launch vehicles as they can be made more reliable, and thus safer, because the same vehicle is flown over and over again. Substantially lower launch costs are achieved because there is no need to rebuild your vehicle each time, just refuel it. Such vehicles could not only spur the return of lost business to domestic entities, but also vastly increase the market space. Unfortunately, the existing commercial providers seem to have little incentive to develop such craft.

 

Existing launch providers feel it should be the government, as usual, who pays them to develop these new craft because of the high development costs. This is the way it's been for 50 years - why change it now? That there are no clear requirements and no clear market does not help. Government, on the other hand, feels that if they are going to put up the money they should again control the development process. But Congressional budgets and economic realities have thwarted all such hopes.

 

[ Top ]

Good and Bad Experimentation

To break out of the current mentality may require breaking out of NASA altogether, and that is precisely what several ventures have done.

 

One group, the X Prize Foundation, aimed to award $10 million to the first organization to get the same piloted vehicle to 100 kilometers altitude and back, twice within two weeks. A significant number of teams from all around the world took up this challenge and a wide variety of vehicle designs were proposed and started. When the prize was won, however, all the other teams all stopped. There were no follow-on awards to win so teams could not raise the money needed to complete and fly their vehicles. As a result, none of the other technologies were completed.

 

In recent years a number of private companies and organizations have sprung up, staffed by people who are tired of waiting for NASA to open civilian access space. Often funded from their own pockets, these new players are all small by comparison, but what they lack in finances they make up for in ingenuity and adaptability. The most successful of them have embraced an engineering concept widely used in other fields: incremental development. For rocketry, that means building a small prototype that one can afford, then testing it to ever-increasing heights. By being affordable (i.e. costing tens to hundreds of thousands verses tens to hundreds of millions), it is possible to rebuild if something does not quite work the way they thought. Over time, vehicles can scaled up to the multi-million dollar prototypes because previous flight testing has demonstrated flight reliability and stability showing that all the subsystems have been tested in actual flight, and pose much less technical (and therefore financial) risk.

 

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The X Factor

The X programs of the mid-twentieth century were designed to test current technology in new ways to demonstrate new advances and "push the envelope" to see what the next level might be like. Fairly small teams with fixed goals and budgets on a few hundred million over three to ten years were the standard. Design to "build a little, fly a little and learn a lot", these teams would do the best with existing capabilities and then push them until something broke. Data from these efforts were analyzed and changes made to the next vehicle and it then flew to push a little farther. This method produced rapid advances in knowledge and experience while minimizing capital costs. They were dangerous - people did lose their lives - but the ability to look closely at what happened and adjust so that particular problem wouldn't happen again allowed for this rapid progress.

 

In this environment, "Failure is not an option - it's a requirement". Failing is how we learn, because until we fail, we're using our existing knowledge instead of learning something new.  Various efforts over the last two decades have tried to match this approach. They should give us valuable lessons from both their successes and their failures. Our choice today is do we learn from them or repeat them?

 

DC-X

Delta Clipper Experimental was a small, low budget research program started in 1990 to design, build and test a new type of vehicle - one using off-the-shelf components, capable of fully reusable, single stage flight and allowing for rapid turnaround by a small service crew. Initial study funds came through the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) at a mere $12 million. This design competition, evaluated almost a dozen design concepts and approaches - ALL of which looked to be doable. Unlike previous X-programs where $200-300 million was put into building and flying three to five test vehicles, the SSRT (Single Space Rocket Technology) Program put $35 million into building one test vehicle with limited goals. In 1992, the McDonnell-Douglas design was selected, and went from contract signing to vehicle roll-out in 18 months, with first flight following a few months later. While initial funding demonstrated the validity of the approach, their early success created intense political struggles that made getting additional funds to expand the flight envelope extremely difficult. In the end, to complete flight tests, the program was transferred to NASA. And when a failed landing gear deployment resulted in the vehicle falling over and burning, NASA threw in the towel.

 

Interestingly, all other aircraft with retractable landing gear have tell-tales that inform the pilot if the gear isn't down and locked. Such a tell-tale on the last DC-XA flight would have allowed the pilot to extend the hover and burn off propellant before setting the vehicle down. If the gear were pneumatically controlled with options other than all-up and all-down positions, the opposite gear could have been commanded up a small amount (six inches to a foot) and the vehicle commanded to hover until almost all propellant was used before settling slightly leaning away from the undeployed gear. Either of these scenarios would have saved the vehicle to continue flight tests after any needed minor repairs.

 

Lessons Learned:

1.     Small teams with small budgets can build and fly experimental vehicles

2.     Under funded vehicles can't complete their flight test schedules

3.     Build more than one flight vehicle

4.     Landing gear tell-tales

 

 

X-33

Hot on BMDO's successes with DC-X, NASA decided in the summer of 1993 to get "back" into X programs. Dan Goldin, NASA Administrator at the time, was reported to have said "I don't know what X programs are but we're going to get some." Unfortunately, the cornerstone concept of "build a little, fly a little, learn a lot" was completely ignored. NASA choose as DC-X's successor a program with the MOST number of unknowns. the GREATEST number of new technologies AND the FARTHEST technological jump - the Lockheed-Martin Skunk Works "VentureStar" prototype vehicle. With a billion dollars of taxpayer money, and $211 million more from LMSW, the X-33 program ran into problem after problem after problem trying to push all areas of aerospace development on one vehicle - and after five years failed to even build a spaceship, let alone fly it.

 

A better alternative would have been to chose the vehicle with the fewest new technologies and to build two or three of them and fly them frequently, pushing the envelope a LITTLE bit more each time. When the first ship broke ("pranged" in aerospace parleyance), apply the lessons learned to modifying the second ship and then fly that one until it breaks - and apply those lessons to the third. Flying real hardware generates real data, which is of far more value to improving understanding than running simulations on a computer trying to extrapolate into the unknown.

 

OR ... NASA could have identified the ten most useful or desired technologies that needed improvement and split their $1 billion into ten $100 million demonstration programs. We'd have gotten at least ten new technologies that had proven themselves and could then be combined as needed. If they'd created competitive awards that split each program's funding 50-30-20 or maybe 40-30-20-10 (or even 20-20-20-20-20) they'd have funded 30-50 new competitive technologies that would have benefited the companies, the government and the people far more than ever could.

 

Lessons Learned:

1.     Don't put your billion dollar development funds into one vehicle

2.     Limit the number of new technologies you integrate into one vehicle

3.     Advances are made in incremental steps not giant leaps

 

 

X Prize

Even prizes are not adverse to "failures". In 1996 the X Prize Foundation was created to offer $10 million in prize money to the first team to send the equivalent of 3 people to 100 kilometers twice in two weeks using substantially the same vehicle. There was much excitement at the launch of the prize, but over time it became apparent that the biggest challenge facing X Prize was raising the money to use as an award. After much effort and many schemes, and with Burt Rutan's team making significant progress towards winning it, the Foundation managed to get an insurance policy written that would pay the prize if someone succeeded before the deadline - in effect betting that no one could do it.

 

When Rutan's team did succeed, the Foundation now needed a new reason for existence and billed itself as an organization to run and promote such competitions. Unfortunately, the cost of promoting these competitions continues to drain funds from actually doing the work the prizes are designed to stimulate.

 

Lessons Learned:

1.     "Winner take all" funding means only one technology is developed

2.     Promotion and PR are not the business of aerospace development

3.     Raise your funds first, then announce your competition

 

[ Top ]

Flying Outside The Box

One of the key parts of X development is that you can fund various required technologies independently without worrying about the problems of integrating multiple unproven components at the same time. Scaling the successes up offers the chance to achieve technological advancement with minimal economic risk - you are more likely to get a bang for your buck. Development issues focus on the physical size and operational improvements to the vehicle rather than "will it work at all". Scaling is not to be taken lightly - you can not just build a bigger vehicle, but most systems will have been tested separately under conditions similar to those they would experience in actual flight. Integrating known quantities is always easier than integrating unknowns. This drastically reduces the cost of the inevitable setbacks as they happen to parts rather than whole vehicles. It also generates data on the endurance of each subsystem. Incremental testing produces this data without risking the high expense of a full-up vehicle.

 

Existing launch vehicles (including the Shuttle) are all based on military missile technology and design approaches. Since the military has absolutely no use for a "reusable missile", reusability has never been an ingredient in the design mix, and trade offs supporting reusability have never been thoroughly explored. For reliable, low cost access to space, however, reusability and reliability are the key factors.

 

All airlines operate on a "fuel cost multiple" - that is their profitability is based on meeting some multiple of fuel cost as that is their critical operating variable. The usual value is 3 - flights are profitable when revenue per flight exceeds three time fuel cost oer flight. True spacecraft will have to be designed so that the same paradigm is used, which means that we need a fully reusable, highly reliable vehicle that can fly and land, be fueled and reloaded, fly and land, be refueled and reloaded, etc. There is no practical or economic way to do this if you have to rebuild the vehicle each flight. If your vehicle design requires you to throw away part of the structure on your way up or down, you've failed to meet the basic requirement and need to start over. Now it may be that we need more than three times propellant costs to be profitable, but that needs to be determined by each vehicle based on their operating model. The lower the multiple and/or propellant costs, the more likely the "flight plan" is to be a profitable undertaking.

 

The question then becomes how does one motivate companies to follow an incremental development plan while developing reliable, reusable launch vehicles funded by the government? The best way it can be done is by funding the overall goal by steps or phases that expand upon the demonstrated capabilities of the previous phase. Each phase needs to be designed to foster a number of successful competitors, with the ultimate aim to have several commercially viable for-profit launch vehicles, completely independent from each other. Each of these vehicles should be orders of magnitudes cheaper to operate, and able to sustain a much higher launch rate, than what is presently available.

 

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Changing The Funding Paradigm

What we would like to propose is a shift from the current "pay to play" approach to a "pay for performance" funding model. Incentives to demonstrate a desired capability should be rewarded with prizes large enough to make trying them attractive, rather than the government prepaying contractors to see if something is maybe possible and sometimes getting little or nothing of value for their (or should we say our) money.

 

The traditional approach would dictate that NASA set up a Program Office to investigate the possibility that there may be some new technology that would be useful. The office can then grow as new ideas are fermented, money is added to their budget, RFPs issued, and contracts granted to those who meet the predetermined qualifications. And soon we have another perpetual bureaucracy that spends as much time keeping itself alive as doing engineering designs, but we do not have much new technology.

 

What is needed instead is a system to set forth goals, establish payments for meeting those goals, monitor the progress of those hoping to claim an award for those goals, and issuing checks to the successful ones who demonstrate the requirements of the goals. This is what an Awards Office does, and this is what we need.

 

[ Top ]

Leading Rather Than Managing

To this end, we propose the establishment of the Fund to Advance Single Stage  Technology (F.A.S.S.T.), which would operate based of the following simple rules:

 

 


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Five Phases to Space

Phase 1 - "Controlled Flight"

Requirement:

The vehicle must reach at least 25 kilometers, stay above that mark for 1 minute, then make a controlled directed landing (specifically not just drifting with the winds on a parachute), while carrying at least one adult human being. The vehicle must make this entire trip in less than one hour, launch to landing, and must achieve 25,000 meters altitude within half an hour of launch.

 

Prizes:

To promote the widest range of participants and options, this Phase is structured to provide 10 equal awards for ten competitors who meet the above requirements.

 

Ten prizes for this phase:

$  16 million.

Total for this phase:

$160 million.

 

Phase 2 - "Federal X Prize"

Requirement:

The vehicle must reach an altitude of 100 kilometers twice within 14 days, carrying three adult human beings. The crew must fly substantially the same vehicle (at least 90% dry mass) on the second flight, but it does not have to be the same three people on the second trip.

 

Prizes:

First competitor gets:

$120 million.

Second competitor gets:

$  72 million.

Third competitor gets:

$  48 million.

Total for this phase:

$240 million.

 

Phase 3 - "Rocket Express"

Requirement:

The vehicle must demonstrate the ability to travel between two points at least 3,000 kilometers apart in less than 30 minutes, a trip only attainable by rocket. This is about the minimum distance where rocket transportation starts to become commercially viable. Again, the vehicle must carry three adult human beings during its trips. The crew must fly substantially the same vehicle (at least 90% dry mass) on the return flight within 7 days to claim the prize, but it does not have to be the same three people on the second trip. The launch site and landing sites at each location must be within 50 km of each other.

 

Prizes:

First competitor gets:

$200 million.

Second competitor gets:

$120 million.

Third competitor gets:

$  80 million.

Total for this phase:

$400 million.

 

Phase 4 - "Long Range Rocket Express"

Requirement:

The vehicle must demonstrate the ability to travel between two points at least 10,000 kilometers apart in under an hour. The performance needed to achieve this is just short of that needed to achieve orbit. Again, the vehicle must carry three adult human beings during its trips, and the crew must fly substantially the same vehicle (at least 90% dry mass) on the return flight within 72 hours to claim the prize, but it does not have to be the same three people on the second trip. The launch and landing sites at each location must be within 50 km of each other.

 

Prizes:

First competitor gets:

$  600 million.

Second competitor gets:

$  360 million.

Third competitor gets:

$  240 million.

Total for this phase:

$1,200 million.

 

Phase 5 - "Orbit"

Requirement:

The vehicle must demonstrate the ability to fly from some point in American territory and complete at least one and a half orbits at an altitude of not less than 200 km. The vehicle must land within 50 km of launch point and fly a second orbital trip (as described above) within 24 hours of landing. At least three adult human beings must be carried to orbit and safely return, but it does not have to be the same three people on the second trip. Again, at least 90% of the dry mass of the vehicle must be reused in the second flight.

Prizes:

First competitor gets:

$1,000 million.

Second competitor gets:

$  600 million.

Third competitor gets:

$  400 million.

Total for this phase:

$2,000 million.

 

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Subsidiaries

To encourage a wide range of competitors, a single entity may only claim at most one prize from each phase. For this purpose, wholly or partly owned subsidiaries count the same as their parent organizations.

 

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Alternative Formulas

There may be a desire to provide "Also Ran" funding to a forth and even a fifth competitor to ensure a dynamic and competitive environment is built up. To that effect, it may be advantageous to award prizes on a 40/30/20/10 basis or to provide identical prizes for each Phase at four awards of 25% or five awards of 20% of each Phase prize funding. These options would provide the following payments:

 

Phase

Award

40%

30%

20%

10%

1- Controlled Flight

$160,000,000

$16,000,000 x 10

2 - Fed X Prize

$240,000,000

$96,000,000

$72,000,000

$48,000,000

$24,000,000

3 - Rocket Express

$400,000,000

$160,000,000

$120,000,000

$80,000,000

$40,000,000

4 - Long Express

$1,200,000,000

$480,000,000

$360,000,000

$240,000,000

$120,000,000

5 - Orbit

$2,000,000,000

$800,000,000

$600,000,000

$400,000,000

$200,000,000

Total

$4,000,000,000

 

Phase

Award

#

25%

#

20%

1- Controlled Flight

$160,000,000

10

$16,000,000

10

$16,000,000

2 - Fed X Prize

$240,000,000

4

$60,000,000

5

$48,000,000

3 - Rocket Express

$400,000,000

4

$100,000,000

5

$80,000,000

4 - Long Express

$1,200,000,000

4

$300,000,000

5

$240,000,000

5 - Orbit

$2,000,000,000

4

$500,000,000

5

$400,000,000

Total

$4,000,000,000

 

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Liability

One significant challenge with achieving these goals will be liability insurance and our litigious society. Legislation will need to be enacted to limit the scope of third party suits. Past experiences have made it significantly more difficult for non-government backed entities to acquire even the training to properly handle propellants let alone the propellants themselves. Provided appropriate safety procedures are in force, liability should be limited to restrict the scope of suits that can be brought.

 

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Death and Taxes

The X Programs of the mid-twentieth century were dangerous undertakings and people died flying them. This will likely happen with the FASST program as well. Unlike the X programs, however, the pilots and crews will not be military personnel. As such, legislation will be required to provide for agreements that must be signed by all involved that they know and accept the dangers involved and that they relinquish rights to civil suits in the event of injury and/or death. Sample language can be taken from the Virginia Spaceflight Liability and Immunity Act (See Appendix B).

 

Additionally, to encourage investment in advance of awards, legislation enabling tax credits, tax exemptions or tax deferrals for private funds invested with declared competitors should be established.

 

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Office Staffing

Since we are seeking to promote commercial development, the FASST Awards Office should have a very small but dedicated staff. There needs to be an accountant, three technical advisors and a manager. Ideally they would be experienced civil servants between the ages of 45 and 55. When the ten or fifteen year program has run its course or all prizes have been awarded, the staff should be given full retirement benefits at two pay grades above their operating level and the Office closed. Why? The people who administer the program should have an incentive to not become a bureaucracy. They should be rewarded for seeing the goals achieved and closing the doors.

 

The funding should be approved by Congress as a one-time expense and placed in an interest bearing escrow account administered by the FASST Awards Office. While there are rules limiting multi-year funding of programs, this can be a single funding appropriation or a multi-year appropriation where no Office starts until the Awards are fully funded. Funds are administered over no more than 15 years. See Appendix A -Enabling Legislation.

 

It would not be that difficult for any number of government agencies to fund the FASST Awards Office as a one-time expenditure. Staff salaries and other expenses for the operation of the Office can and should come from the interest accrued on the escrowed fund.

 

Any accumulated interest that is unspent at the termination of the program (either after 15 years or on completion of all phases) should be returned to Congress as a reward for having lead the country rather than managed it.

 


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Advantages

So what does all this have to do with NASA and how can it help us get to the Moon and beyond? A fully reusable single stage orbital vehicle can do many things, and do them affordably. So how would we use one to go to the moon? Refuel it in LEO!

 

Advantage 1 - Half Way to Anywhere

Delta-v Graph - LEO to anywhere The energy required to get to Low Earth Orbit is substantial -- almost 10 km/s. It is most of the energy you need to get around in the inner solar system. If we could use the same vehicle for extended system operations, without having to unload and transfer cargo, we can deliver any payload from the surface of the Earth to wherever it needed to go with one vehicle. To accomplish this, the vehicle needs to be able to be refueled on orbit.

 

Orbital storage of cryogenics is problematic today because of the thermal insulation required, but using storable propellants such as hydrogen peroxide and kerosene could be stored on orbit for extended periods without special requirements.

 

Such a single stage reusable vehicle can be refueled on orbit and deliver its' payload to low Earth orbit, to geostationary orbit, lunar orbit, and even to the surface of the moon!

 

Advantage 2 - Verify Before Deploy

Using dense propellants as an example, four automated flights carrying high-strength peroxide, and one flight carrying JP-8 to an orbital refuel depot would allow a sixth flight to carry a satellite to LEO, refuel at the depot, and then take the satellite out to GEO and deploy it before heading home. Why is this important? If on orbit checkout fails, you close can the doors and bring the satellite back with you, to be verified and fixed on the ground. Then you deploy it again.

 

In fact, the satellite could be verified while the rocket is being refueled and if there are problems simply returned to the surface of the Earth without going any further. On orbit verification of satellites would save the insurance companies a considerable amount of money. Similarly, using on orbit refueling insurers that your transfer to geostationary orbit is successful. No more satellites in the wrong or useless orbits.

 

Advantage 3 - Support for Lunar Outpost

If NASA is serious about using the Moon as an outpost, a reusable single stage vehicle that can be refueled on orbit provides the capability, at low operating cost, of resupplying that outpost on a monthly, biweekly, or even weekly basis.

 

Such an operation would allow for smaller deliveries tailored to the specific needs of the moment. If the lunar astronauts decide that a Dustbuster is the best thing for removing lunar soil from their suits, a quick e-mail or web order can be made and a dozen can be shipped out on the next supply rocket.

 

Because the construction of a new vehicle is not required each time you make a supply run, the cost of supplying the base is substantially lower, by orders of magnitude, than using the currently proposed Constellation system.

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Summation

We have proposed an improvement to the existing launch capabilities of the country, funded in a single appropriation of $4 billion (less than one year of shuttle flights) that provides both bureaucratic and entrepreneurial incentives to follow an incremental development approach. The vehicles succeeding in each phase progress toward the goal of achieving much higher flight rates and much lower operational costs than any current space transportation system, domestic or foreign. Such a program could, in a short time, for a small amount of money, develop these capabilities and create multiple classes of vehicles that would finally allow the beleaguered taxpayer to participate in the future of space travel, and in the process, expand American influence to the heavens.

 

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More Information

For the latest version of this paper, go to http://www.erps.org/papers/FASST.html

 

To discuss this paper, join the email list at http://lists.erps.org/mailman/listinfo/FASST-list

Version: 1.06              Dated: 20 Aug 2009


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Appendix A - Enabling Legislation

 

Since the original paper was writing in 2003, much of the needed legislation for awarding prizes under the NASA Act has been put in place. To enable NASA to fund the FASST program, the following changes are needed:

 

Amend Section 314 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 as follows -

 

(1)  Amend subsection (i)(4) by striking '$10,000,000' and inserting '$10,000,000,000': and

(2)  Amend subsection (i)(5) by striking '$1,000,000' and inserting '$1,000,000,000'.

 


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Appendix B - Virginia Spaceflight Liability and Immunity Act

 

Article 24 of Title 8.01 of the Code of Virginia established legal precedence for a waiver for spaceflight participants. The code can be accessed at:

 

http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+ful+HB3184H2

 

HOUSE BILL NO. 3184

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

(Proposed by the Governor

on March 26, 2007)

(Patron Prior to Substitute--Delegate Kilgore)

 

A BILL to amend the Code of Virginia by adding in Chapter 3 of Title 8.01 an article numbered 24, consisting of sections numbered 8.01-227.8 through 8.01-227.10, relating to the promotion of spaceflight in Virginia.

 

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:

 

1.  That the Code of Virginia is amended by adding in Chapter 3 of Title 8.01 an article numbered 24, consisting of sections numbered 8.01-227.8 through 8.01-227.10, as follows:

 

Article 24.

Spaceflight Liability and Immunity Act.

§ 8.01-227.8. Definitions.

 

For purposes of this section:

 

"Participant" means any space flight participant as that term is defined in 49 U.S.C. § 70102.

 

"Participant Injury" means any bodily injury, including death; emotional injury; or property damage sustained by the participant. 

 

"Spaceflight activities" means launch services or reentry services as those terms are defined in 49 U.S.C. § 70102.

 

"Spaceflight entity" means any public or private entity holding, either directly or through a corporate subsidiary or parent, a license, permit, or other authorization issued by the United States Federal Aviation Administration pursuant to the Federal Space Launch Amendments Act (49 U.S.C. §70101 et seq.), including, but not limited to, a safety approval and a payload determination.  "Spaceflight entity" shall also include any manufacturer or supplier of components, services, or vehicles that have been reviewed by the United States Federal Aviation Administration as part of issuing such a license, permit, or authorization

 

§ 8.01-227.9. Civil immunity for spaceflight entities.

 

A. Except as provided in subsection B, a spaceflight entity is not liable for a participant injury resulting from the risks of spaceflight activities, provided that the participant has been informed of the risks of spaceflight activities as required by federal law pursuant to federal law and this article, and the participant has given his informed consent that he is voluntarily participating in spaceflight activities after having been informed of the risks of those activities as required by federal law and this article. Except as provided in subsection B, no (i) participant, (ii) participant's representative, including the heirs, administrators, executors, assignees, next of kin, and estate of the participant, or (iii) any person who attempts to bring a claim on behalf of the participant for a participant injury, is authorized to maintain an action against or recover from a spaceflight entity for a participant injury that resulted from the risks of spaceflight activities.

 

B. Nothing in subsection A shall prevent or limit the liability of a spaceflight entity if the spaceflight entity does either of the following:

 

1. Commits an act or omission that constitutes gross negligence evidencing willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that act or omission proximately causes a participant injury; or

 

2. Intentionally causes a participant injury.

 

C. Any limitation on legal liability afforded by this section to a spaceflight entity is in addition to any other limitations of legal liability otherwise provided by law.

 

§ 8.01-227.10. Warning required.

 

A. Every spaceflight entity providing spaceflight activities to a participant shall have each participant sign the warning statement specified in subsection B.

 

B. The warning statement described in subsection A shall contain, at a minimum and in addition to any language required by federal law, the following statement:

 

"WARNING AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: I understand and acknowledge that, under Virginia law, there is no civil liability for bodily injury, including death, emotional injury, or property damage sustained by a participant in spaceflight activities provided by a spaceflight entity if such injury or damage results from the risks of the spaceflight activity. I have given my informed consent to participate in spaceflight activities after receiving a description of the risks of spaceflight activities as required by federal law pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 70105 and 14 C.F.R. § 460.45. The consent that I have given acknowledges that the risks of spaceflight activities include, but are not limited to, risks of bodily injury, including death, emotional injury, and property damage. I understand and acknowledge that I am participating in spaceflight activities at my own risk. I have been given the opportunity to consult with an attorney before signing this statement."

 

C. Failure to comply with the requirements concerning the warning statement provided in this section shall prevent a spaceflight entity from invoking the privileges of immunity provided by this article.

 

2.  That the provisions of this act shall expire on July 1, 2013.

 

 

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